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FAIR USE IS GOOD FOR CREATIVITY AND 
INNOVATION 
 




Commenting on legal debates in other countries is usually bad manners. 
When, however, the debates concern a law from your own country, and that 
law is being misrepresented, it may be of service to set the record straight. 
The record, based on almost 300 years of Anglo-American case law and the 
experiences of those of us who apply fair use every day in our jobs, 
demonstrates that fair use is good for creativity and innovation, and in 
practice works well. You don’t have to take my word for it; if you are 
willing to put the time in, and have an open mind to learn how fair use 
actually works, you’ll see.  
What follows is a description of the 35 year journey I have undertaken 
to understand fair use. First, I discuss how it has been common for centuries 
for our greatest artists to creatively copy from others. Next, I discuss how 
fair use helps authors to engage in such creative copying, while 
simultaneously ensuring that those who seek to capitalize on the hard work 
of others with no social benefit are denied fair use privileges. I then discuss 
my experiences with fair use as a lawyer, Congressional staffer, and as a 
law professor. Finally, I dispel a number of the myths about fair use: that it 
leads to a lot of litigation, is too fact-specific or unpredictable, and is 
somehow peculiar to the American legal system much like vegemite is to 
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I. THE GREAT ARTISTS COPY, AND CREATIVELY 
 
I have been a musician for 60 years, first playing viola, then clarinet 
(now bass clarinet and basset horn). I was a music composition major at 
university, obtaining both undergraduate and graduate degrees. I studied in 
detail how the Western World’s greatest composers created by building 
upon past masters while adding their own unique contributions to the music 
literature. My studies involved analyzing every chord, every melody or 
motif in a symphony or sonata, and tracing their roots. Once you understand 
how a composition is put together, you appreciate both the innovations in it 
as well as the debts to predecessors.  
Many times, composers have showed their debts to their predecessors 
by copying, in a creative way, from those predecessors. In certain time 
periods, basing your work on another’s was a revered art form. One of the 
most famous Renaissance composers, Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina, 
wrote dozens of parody masses based on music by other composers.1 
                                                 
1 Josquin de Prez’s “Missa Malheur Me Bat,” “Missa Mater Patris,” and “Missa Fortuna 
Desperata” are further examples of masses based on others’ music, as is Antoine Brumels’ 
“Missa de Dringhs”. 
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Parody masses did not make fun of the original, but were instead designed 
to show respect for and appreciation of the earlier composer’s music while 
simultaneously showing off the second composer’s own skills. The use of 
the first composer’s work was not use of a mere single line or two, but 
rather involved copying the entire texture from the original. It has been 
estimated that by the middle of the sixteenth century, most masses were 
parody masses. 
In the Classical and Romantic eras so obvious and accepted was 
transformative copying from predecessors that Johannes Brahms rejoined, 
in response to a critic pointing out that the allegro section in the first 
movement of his first symphony was derived from Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony: “"Any ass can see that.” Mozart, when meeting Salieri for the 
first time, remarked that he had written variations on an aria of Salieri’s.2 
Salieri, far from being upset at this unauthorized derivative work, was 
pleased. So common was this practice then and later that Wikipedia gives a 
non-exhaustive list of 187 different composers whose works were the 
subject of variations by other composers.3  
Conductor John Eliot Gardiner has pointed out that Beethoven often 
copied directly from Mozart: 
 
 There is a very real sense in which the spirit of Mozart imbues the 
 early symphonies of Beethoven, particularly the second. Look at 
 the finale and the very abrupt octave exchange in the second bar. 
 This derives from the opening of Mozart’s Haffner symphony. And 
one gets the same feeling even more strongly in the Eroica 
[symphony of Beethoven]. So many melodic, rhythmical, and 
harmonic features derive directly from Mozart. Not only is the main 
theme borrowed directly from [Mozart’s] 39th symphony, but also 
features that one might typically regard as Beethoven’s, like those 
                                                 
*This article reflects only my personal views. 
2 These were the six variations on "Mio caro adone" K. 180 . 
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_variations_on_a_theme_by_another_composer 
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agonizingly harsh dissonances in the first movement [of the Eroica], 
where he piles up one chord after another with A,C,E, and F on top 
of each other. And you think, “surely that must be entirely his own 
invention, no one else could possibly have done that [before].” 
 
Not so. Look at the introduction to Mozart’s same Eb symphony, K. 
543, and there you find almost the identical chord superimposed, but 
in a Mozartian way, without the brazen, shocking impact that 
Beethoven achieves with his Eroica. 
 
I think this is the key to it: Beethoven’s concept of orchestral sound 
– immediately arresting, even bizarre – and his concept of 
symphonic shape is unmistakably his own. He may have drawn 
elements from other composers; he may have used their rhythmical 
shapes, their motives, and harmonies as a springboard, but his whole 
way of handling material is entirely new.4 
 
That’s the way the creativity works; if we want to truly nurture 
creativity, our copyright laws must work that way too: fair use does. 
Beethoven’s copying from Mozart is, in classic fair use terminology, a 
transformative use: he copied Mozart’s music but in doing so 
“communicates something new and different from the original … . “5 The 
role of fair use, like the copyright system as a whole, is thus to encourage 
the new and different.  
 
Here is a very recent example from the visual arts: 
 
 
                                                 
4 This interview is on one CD from a multiple CD set of Gardiner’s conducting all the 
Beethoven symphonies on the Archiv Produktion label, #445-907-2 (1994). On the disc, 
Gardiner includes the relevant recorded snippets from Mozart’s and Beethoven’s works.  
5 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015). 





This work, by illustrator Tim O’Brien, responds to Trump advisor 
Kellyanne Conway’s recasting of blatant lies as “alternative facts.” Mr. 
O’Brien’s fanciful cover was created by recreating exactly the look and feel 
of an actual cover and by sampling and photoshopping illustrations from the 
once ubiquitous Little Golden Books series, popular when I was a young 
child. Using actual images from those books, he adds “alternate fact labels,” 
in which two children become pancakes, a dog becomes a cat, a chair 
becomes a table. A child drawing becomes a pirate. Mr. O’Brien’s work is 
6 Fair us is good for creativity, innovation  
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
fair use of the original;6  true, he did not alter the actual works, but through 
their transformed context and different labels, he wittily ridiculed Ms. 
Conway’s ridiculous remark. He communicated something different. It 
shouldn’t matter whether we call this criticism, comment, parody, satire or 
anything else. Nor should it matter if the use is on a government approved 
closed list of permissible uses. The only question should be whether society 
– in all countries -- is better off allowing this type of creativity. The answer 
is, yes, we are. 
Fair use does not condone free use or laziness. As Judge Leval, who 
coined the transformative use metaphor, explained: 
 
The word “transformative” … is … a suggestive symbol for a 
complex thought, and does not mean that any and all changes made 
to an author's original text will necessarily support a finding of fair 
use.7 
 
Those who fear fair use will stifle creativity have it backwards. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held,  fair use “permits courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle 
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”8  
 
 
A. Fair use helps authors 
 
One misrepresentation about fair use is that it reduces copyright owners’ 
rights. The above examples, in which famous composers over the centuries 
have happily copied from each other belie this. And the question falsely 
assumes that copyright owners should have absolute control over all 
unauthorized uses of their works. This has never been the case, not for 
copyright or real property. No copyright law in history has allowed 
                                                 
6 Both under copyright and trademark law. 
7 Id. 
8 See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)(citing earlier 
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anything remotely approximating full control, nor should such a law exist. 
If it did, we would have no book reviews that quoted from the book being 
reviewed; no breaking news stories that used photographs or film clips, 
unless improbably all rights had been cleared; no personal pictures of the 
thousands of buildings throughout the world that are subject to copyright; 
no parodies or satires; no classroom uses. No one should want such a world. 
The existence of a fair use defense does not mean any particular claim 
of fair use will succeed. I have argued cases in court in favor of fair use 
applying. I have argued cases in court against fair use applying. I have won 
some of those arguments, and lost others, like all authors. In all cases, the 
assessment is driven by whether the claimed fair use furthers the goals of 
copyright.  If a use furthers the goals of creating more works, one can 
hardly say that authors’ rights have been diminished. The majority of fair 
use cases in the U.S., after all, are between two authors, so which author’s 
rights have, allegedly, been reduced? 
Fair use arose, and still functions, as a way to encourage learning 
through the judicious use of an earlier work for a socially beneficial 
purpose, most typically in a second author’s work. That’s why courts have 
heavily emphasized the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use on the 
market for the original work. A use that substantially interferes with the 
market for another work through wholesale copying is not benefitting 
society and is not fair use.  
 
II. FAIR USE IS A TOOL, AND A GOOD ONE AT THAT 
 
Law is not an end in itself. Law is not an aesthetic object: we don’t love 
laws. Law is merely a tool to achieve societal goals. Fair use is one tool to 
achieve copyright’s goals. There are other copyright tools too: the idea-
expression dichotomy, the scènes à faire doctrine, the requirement that 
unauthorized copying be more than de minimis to be infringing, and of 
course the array of exclusive rights and remedies. All work together as part 
                                                                                                                            
quotations). 
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of a whole to achieve copyright’s goals. None is primus inter partes, and all 
have an important role to play. 
Sometimes a particular tool is appropriate and sometimes it isn’t. if a 
screwdriver doesn’t work for a particular task, we might use a hammer 
instead, but if we do, we don’t throw away the screwdriver or refuse to use 
it for other tasks. Instead, we use the tool that is the most appropriate for the 
task at hand. When the fair use tool fits, there should be a finding of fair 
use. When it doesn’t fit, fair use shouldn’t be found, but in doing so we 
wouldn’t say fair use will never be appropriate in the future, no more than 
we would with the screwdriver. No one should be for or against all claimed 
assertions of fair use, any more than you should be for or against ever using 
a screwdriver.  
Here are two examples of how fair use works as a good tool to separate 
the fair use sheep from the infringing goats.9 Both examples involving the 
same defendant, artist Jeff Koons. In the first case, Rogers v. Koons, 
photographer Art Rogers from Marin County, California (my home county) 
took the picture on the left, which Koons infringed by having the sculptural 





Koons didn’t even go through the trouble of making the sculpture 
himself. Instead, he took a copy of Roger’s photograph, tore off the 
copyright notice, and sent it to real artists in Italy, with instructions to 
                                                 
9 The agricultural reference is to Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 
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closely copy it with small color additions, and the flowers in the woman’s 
ears. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rightly rejected fair use, 
memorably holding, “it is not really the parody flag that appellants are 
sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy.” 10 Amen. When I was a 
congressional staffer, we held a hearing with Rogers as our first witness, 
explaining the travails he went through after being ripped off by a celebrity 
artist. 
The Rogers case was handed down in 1992. Fourteen years later, in 
2006, the same court handed down another opinion in which Koons was the 
defendant for again copying photographs without permission. This time, the 
court of appeals rightly found fair use.11 In the second case, Koons copied a 
photo of a woman from a fashion magazine (“Silk Sandals”), altered it, and 
made it  into a collage from other photos.  Plaintiff’s photograph is the first 






                                                                                                                            
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
10 960 F.2d 3 01 (2d Cir. 1992).  
11 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 




As described by the court: 
 
Koons scanned the image of “Silk Sandals” into his computer and 
incorporated a version of the scanned image into “Niagara.” He 
included in the painting only the legs and feet from the photograph, 
discarding the background of the airplane cabin and the man's lap on 
which the legs rest. Koons inverted the orientation of the legs so that 
they dangle vertically downward above the other elements of 
“Niagara” rather than slant upward at a 45–degree angle as they 
appear in the photograph. He added a heel to one of the feet and 
modified the photograph's coloring.12 
 
Koons asserted fair use. The court of appeals noted: 
 
                                                 
12  467 F.3d at 248. 
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Koons does not argue that his use was transformative solely because 
Blanch's work is a photograph and his is a painting, or because 
Blanch's photograph is in a fashion magazine and his painting is 
displayed in museums. He would have been ill advised to do 
otherwise. We have declined to find a transformative use when the 
defendant has done no more than find a new way to exploit the 
creative virtues of the original work. … 
 
But Koons asserts—and Blanch does not deny—that his purposes in 
using Blanch's image are sharply different from Blanch's goals in 
creating it.  
… 
Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch's image 
as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic 
consequences of mass media. His stated objective is thus not to 
repackage Blanch's “Silk Sandals,” but to employ it “‘in the creation 
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings.’ ” 
 
One can – and I do – cast a dubious eye on Koons’ bona fide interest in 
critiquing the media and fashion culture in the U.S., given his own fatuous 
celebrity status, but as the court observed, it is not its role to judge the value 
of art. Courts’ task is an objective one, guided by the actual works. And 
judged by that task, Koons’ work was a transformative fair use, regardless 
of what one may think of Koons or his work.  
As the two Koons cases show, fair use is well placed to make rationale 
distinctions constructively furthering the goals of copyright. Judges and 
juries throughout the world are equally able to handle cases like these. 
There is nothing American about the task. It should be pointed out that both 
Koons cases were disputes between two artists. It should also be pointed out 
that in both Koons cases, the appeals court affirmed the trial court below, 
showing how certain the application of fair use can be.  
12 Fair us is good for creativity, innovation  
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
 
III. HOW I CAME TO UNDERSTAND FAIR USE 
 
My understanding with fair use has evolved through different 
experiences, a common way we all learn: through initially being a private 
lawyer and then through seven years of government service, I gained 
experience in the practical and legislative issues raised by fair use. In 
addition to my work as a young lawyer on the American Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco, Inc. case, as a Policy Planning Advisor to the Register of 
Copyrights, I testified as the lead witness before a rare joint hearing of the 
Congressional intellectual property subcommittees on bills to amend 
Section 107 to address concerns about use of unpublished letters in 
biographies. Shortly thereafter I became copyright counsel to the House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, and was intimately involved in 
the legislation that ultimately addressed (in an appropriately modest way) 
those concerns. That experience showed me the wisdom of the drafters of 
Section 107 in not codifying fair use but instead only statutorily recognizing 
it without altering the common law that gave life to the doctrine. 
As a full-time law professor from 1995 to 2000, I had the joy and 
challenge of teaching fair use to students. The highlight for me was one 
course in which, rather than consulting the Copyright Act or reading court 
opinions, we spent three classes discussing what our ideal fair use provision 
would look like, without using the label fair use: what types of unauthorized 
uses should be permitted, and what factors would you develop to see 
whether any particular use should be permitted? It was a great process that I 
recommend to everyone. The end result was almost identical to Section 107, 
proving that 300 years of experience in the English and then U.S. courts has 
resulted in a doctrine that has both stood the test of time and been flexible 
enough to evolve with the times. 
Back in private practice in 2000 after leaving academia, I litigated fair 
use cases, both at the district court and appellate level, winning some and 
losing some, like all lawyers. I won a reversal of summary judgment of no 
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fair use in a case before the Seventh Circuit in an opinion by Judge Richard 
Posner in a dispute in which photographs of plush bear toys were made for 
identification purposes.13 I lost a case before the Second Circuit in which I 
argued that photographs of rock music posters copied in a coffee table 
holiday book were not used for identification or transformative use 
purposes, and so should not be fair use.14 Since 2006, I have been a 
copyright counsel at Google Inc. where I routinely advise internally about 
fair use for new products or services that are being developed. I also 
participated in Google’s two big fair use litigations: the Books Project case 
in which the Second Circuit found fair use,15 and the case brought by Oracle 
involving Java and Android in which Oracle sought $2 billion in damages 
but which a jury found to be fair use.16 I know the stakes when fair use is at 
issue. I know when to assert fair use and when not to. Most experienced 
copyright lawyers do too. Experience, hard work, and keeping an open 
mind is all that is required. There is no magic to fair use; anyone who wants 
to learn it can. 
I have also learned a great deal from re-reading the opinions of the early 
English common law judges who grappled with the bare bones 1710 Statute 
of Anne, the first general copyright law.17 That legislation said little more 
than that there is an exclusive right to publish your book.  The law said 
nothing about the scope of that right: was copying of as little as 1% without 
permission infringement, or did infringement only occur if you copied 
100% of the book, or could copying of somewhere between 1% and 100% 
be infringement depending on the reason for and effect of the copying? No 
legislative answers were provided, so the early English common law judges 
do what all judges, even in civil law countries do in such circumstances: 
                                                 
13 Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., 292 F3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). Judge Posner and 
I went on to write a law review article together on fair use. See William Patry and Richard 
Posner, “Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred,” 92 University of 
California, Berkeley Law Review 1639 (December 2004). 
14 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley,Ltd.,  448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
15 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
16 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2016 Westlaw 3181206 (N.D. California June 8, 
2016), appeal filed November 14, 2016). 
17 Some of these cases are discussed below. 
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they looked to the purpose of the legislation and developed principles to 
fulfill that purpose.18 The Statute of Anne had a legislative purpose of 
encouraging learning by encouraging the publication of books that 
otherwise wouldn’t have been written. That was a simple and functional 
goal. The goal was, moreover, free of bias whether the book to be 
encouraged was one written by the plaintiff or one written by the defendant. 
In short, the answer to the 1% question was no, that small amount of 
copying wasn’t infringement, as was the answer to the 100% question – you 
can be an infringer even if you copy less than 100%. The answer to where 
in between 1% and 100% infringement would lay (or not) was, “it 
depends,” and over 300 years later, that is still the answer.  
Based on principles not rules, late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century English common law judges, faced with only the 
Parliamentary purpose of encouraging learning, created all of the 
foundational elements of copyright: who is an author, what is an original 
work of authorship, the idea-expression dichotomy, when copying is de 
minimis and therefore not infringing, and when copying does violate the 
statute. The foundational elements of copyright are the same around the 
world, and importantly, are judge-made. They are judge-made because they 
have to be:  creativity and innovation are fact-specific, contextual 
endeavors: if they weren’t, every government in the world by fiat would 
have long ago developed serious rivals to Silicon Valley. 
 
IV. PUTTING FAIR USE IN THE CORRECT CONTEXT 
 
In the early English common law copyright opinions, there were no 
separate “limitations and exceptions,” no affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs 
and defendants were on equal footing, unlike today where a copyright 
holder plaintiff is argued to be in the type of protected class formerly 
reserved for children at risk. In copyright’s formative period, there was a 
                                                 
18 See Aharon Barak, “Purposive Interpretation in Law” (Translated from the Hebrew by 
Sari Bashi, 2007 Princeton University Press). 
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single judicial inquiry under a single legislative purpose of encouraging 
learning. Put simply by Lord Chancellor Eldon in the 1810 case of Wilkins 
v. Aiken: “The question upon the whole is, whether this is a legitimate use 
of the plaintiff’s publication, in the fair exercise of a mental operation, 
deserving the character of an original work.”19 The original work referred to 
here is not plaintiff’s, but defendant’s.  
 
The early judges saw copyright law as a way to mediate between 
conflicting authorial claims to creativity.20 Fair use arose in disputes 
between two authors, not as a way to get free use. Where an unauthorized 
work was itself creative in its employment of a previous work, it was 
regarded as a “new book,” and encouraged under the statute. This is clearly 
seen in unauthorized abridgments. In 1740, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
wrote that unauthorized “abridgments may with great propriety be called a 
new book, because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning, 
and judgment of the author is shewn in them . . .”21 Unauthorized copying 
was not regarded as an inherent social ill, but in some circumstances as a 
social benefit. Seven years before Wilkins v. Aiken, in 1803, Lord 
Ellenborough, in Cary v. Kearsley had held:  
 
That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not of 
itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly 
adopt the work of another: he may so make use of another’s labours 
for the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public; but 
having done so, the question will be, Was the matter used fairly with 
that view?22  
 
Fair use was not a blank ticket to do what you wanted, and it still isn’t. 
                                                 
19 17 Ves. (Chancery) 422, 426 (1810).  
20 Or other social benefits such as reviews and scientific discussions which used portions of 
the copyrighted work. From copyright’s inception in Anglo-American law, sanctioned 
unauthorized uses extended beyond creating a second work.  
21 Gyles v. Wilcox , 2 Atk. 141, 143 (1740). 
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Sometimes the judgment by the early English judges was no, the work 
hadn’t been used fairly, as in the 1752 case of Tonson v. Walker,23 where 
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke condemned defendant’s unauthorized copying 
of an edition of Milton’s (public domain) poetry along with plaintiff’s 
protected editorial notes. Defendant had merely added a few of his own 
notes. The court rightly dismissed defendant’s work as a “mere evasion” of 
plaintiff’s copyright, and not as a bona fide abridgment. In other words, an 
infringement. The English courts’ unified approach to furthering learning 
through a unified judicial inquiry arose from their understanding of the 
creative process and their fidelity to Parliament’s purpose. Their approach 
prevented them from falling prey to the accusation that all unauthorized 
copying is free-riding, to be stamped out at every opportunity, and 
condemned as a moral and social shortcoming. It also led them to ensure 
that those seeking to use a copyrighted work without permission or payment 
have a good reason for doing so, and that too is still the case. 
 
V. FAIR USE IS IMPORTANT TO CULTURE 
 
Copyright in communicative works raises cultural issues. Culture is not 
based on hypothetical markets or fictional rational markets, but instead on 
real flesh-and-blood people expressing their emotions, their fears, and their 
hopes. They can only do so by copying from others who have similar 
emotions, fears, and hopes. You can’t communicate your emotions, fears, 
and hopes to others if you do not communicate in a shared cultural 
language, a language that you did not originate but will hopefully enrich. 
All works therefore exist only in context with past and present authors and 
the larger public: readers can only understand contextually; that is, within 
shared communal understandings. This is what Hans-Georg Gadamer meant 
when he wrote: “Understanding is to be thought … as participating in an 
event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are 
                                                                                                                            
22 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1803).  
23 3 Swans. (App.) 672, 680 (1752).  




Our greatest works of culture have been the result of that process of 
transmission between the past and present through creative copying: that is, 
in fact, the very way the past is transmitted to the present. I learned this first 
hand as a musician, beginning at age six. Children and adults who wish to 
learn how to play a musical instrument must do so by listening to the 
sounds their teachers make and then trying to replicate those sounds as 
closely as possible. Many times you play the same passage in unison so that 
you can keep your teacher’s sound stored in your brain along with yours. 
Tricky rhythms can only be learned by listening to others and by copying 
their playing. For most musicians, this process of copying continues 
throughout their lives, as you seek out new sounds you want to copy and 
make your own. It is the process of copying from others that allows us to 
gain the skills to find our own voice. Here is world-famous clarinetist 
Buddy DeFranco, who has been playing for over seventy years, giving 
advice on “How to Develop Your Own Voice on Clarinet”:  
 
[I] recommend[ ] repeated listening to recordings, transcribing 
 the solos of these players, and playing along with the solos. . . .  
[You] should begin to develop patterns and phrases based on these  
players’ styles. . . . [You] should strive to internalize aspects of the 
masters’ styles and incorporate [them] into [your] own playing.”  
 
Note the title of his advice was not “How to Copy from Others” but 
“How to Develop Your Own Voice,” which you do by copying from others. 
I am fortunate to own a (thoroughly restored) set of early Buffet R-13 
clarinets that Robert Marcellus, the principal clarinetist with the Cleveland 
Orchestra from 1953 to 1973, previously owned and played on. Marcellus’s 
1961 recording of the Mozart Clarinet Concerto with George Szell 
conducting has long been an icon for classical clarinetists, who seek to 
                                                 
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 291 (Continuum Press, 2004 revised edition). 
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replicate Marcellus’s expressiveness. Here is a comment by one person 
about how important it was for him to copy Marcellus’s sound: 
 
I was 12 years old. I hadn’t formed any opinion of Mozart, 
and had never heard of Robert Marcellus. But when I heard 
that recording for the first time, I knew I wanted to be the 
one playing that piece someday. His tone was what hooked 
me. Marcellus had a haunting clarity, a round, dark ring to 
every note. I couldn’t get that sound out of my ear, and 
I still strive for it.  
 
To deny people the ability to copy—whether from a book, a recorded 
performance (as in the Marcellus example), or from any source—is to deny 
them their dream of becoming who they want to be. This applies to groups 
of people, not just to individuals: despite European policymakers’ often 
absurd pronouncements that they need the strongest possible copyright laws 
so that they can protect authors and culture, European jazz exists only 
because European musicians relentlessly copied American jazz musicians, 
without payment. The British rock groups of the late 1960s to early 1970s 
were successful because they relentlessly and shamelessly copied from 
American blues artists and Elvis Presley. Those artists in turn copied from 
each other Ray Charles, described how he set out deliberately to copy Nat 
King Cole: 
I knew . . . that Nat King Cole was bigger than ever. . . .  
Funny thing, but during all those years I was imitating Nat Cole, 
I never thought about it, never felt bad about copying the 
cat’s licks. To me it was practically a science. I worked at it. 
I enjoyed it. I was proud of it, and I loved doing it. 
 
Mr. Charles later decided to move to a different style, but even here he 
copied from gospel music: His famous 1954 composition “I Got a Woman,” 
was unabashedly copied from the 1904 hymn “My Jesus Is All the World to 
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Me” written by a white composer from East Liverpool, Ohio, William 
Lamartine Thompson. Nor was this a one-off: he regularly copied (without 
permission) from other hymn composers: “This Little Girl of Mine,” was 
taken from Clara Ward’s “This Little Light of Mine.”  
 
Copying, done by famous composers and performers from time 
immemorial, is how culture is created and passed on. To deny that is the 
case or to disallow it, is to deny the very nature of culture. Fair use is an 
essential part of ensuring that culture continues to thrive. Judge Pierre Leval 
has written: “Fair use should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally 
tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copyright monopoly. 
To the contrary, it is a necessary part of the overall design.”25 Throughout 
his thirty-nine years as a member of the federal judiciary – sixteen years as 
a trial judge in the Southern District of New York, and twenty-three years 
as an appellate judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Manhattan, Judge Leval has gained a great deal of practical experience in 
deciding fair use cases. His over three decades of experience in applying 
fair use has led him to a greater, not a lesser appreciation of the doctrine’s 
importance in furthering creativity. He is not alone in this view: those with 
the most experience with fair use feel the same way. 
 
VI. FAIR USE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOTS OF LITIGATION 
 
One would not recognize the critical role that fair use plays from the 
attacks on it by some private interests. As revealed in the leaked Sony 
documents, Chris Dodd, head of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), described fair use as “extremely controversial and divisive” in an 
email to the then-United States Trade Representative Michael Froman.26  
Mr. Dodd has no experience with or understanding of copyright, let alone 
fair use. He became the head of the MPAA after declining to run again for 
                                                 
25 Pierre Leval , Toward a Fair Use Standard , 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 , 1110  ( 1990). 
26 See www.techdirt.com/articles/20150416/17252230680/chris-dodds-email-reveals-what-
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the U.S. Senate from my current state of Connecticut, after his involvement 
in favorable real estate deals during the crash of 2008 led to a crash in his 
poll numbers. In any event, Mr. Dodd’s comments are not only false, they 
contradict other public statements by the MPAA, including a thoughtful 
October 2013 MPAA blog post by its very experienced copyright counsel 
Ben Sheffner. Mr. Sheffner was responding to comments about an MPAA 
brief submitted in litigation supporting fair use:  
 
[W] e do want to push back a bit on the suggestion in some of 
the commentary about our brief that the MPAA and its members 
somehow “oppose” fair use, or that our embrace of it in the 
Baltimore Ravens brief represents a shift in our position. That’s 
simply false, a notion that doesn’t survive even a casual encounter 
with the facts. Our members rely on the fair use doctrine every day 
when producing their movies and television shows  – especially 
those that involve parody and news and documentary programs. And 
it’s routine for our members to raise fair use – successfully – 
in court. . . . No thinking person is “for” or “against” fair use in all 
circumstances. As the Supreme Court and countless others have 
said, fair use is a flexible doctrine, one that requires a case-by-case 
examination of the facts, and a careful weighing of all of the 
statutory factors. Some uses are fair; some aren’t.27  
 
I agree with these remarks completely. Yet, it has become common to 
attack fair use as unpredictable, as being merely the right to hire a lawyer. 
The right to hire a lawyer argument applies equally to all litigation, not just 
for authors, not just for the poor, but for the middle class too.28 This is 
particularly a problem in criminal cases where the personal stakes are much, 
                                                                                                                            
mpaa-really- thinks-fair-use-extremely-controversial.shtml  
27 www.mpaa.org/mpaa-and-fair-use-a-quick-history/  
28 See “Middle-Class Dilemma:  Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid,” July 
22, 2010, available at :  www.abajournal.com/news/article/middle-
class_dilemma_cant_afford_lawyers_cant_ qualify_for_legal_aid 
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much higher than whether one pop song infringes another. Some studies 
have indicated that the average hourly income of a person needing legal 
services (of any type) is $25, while the average hourly rate for a new lawyer 
is about $350. Thus, for every hour of a lawyer’s time, the person hiring the 
lawyer would have to work an extra 14 hours just to break even, or almost 
an extra week for just three hours of a lawyer’s time.29 That doesn’t happen, 
and therefore many middle-class people (in addition to the poor) cannot 
access the courts, regardless of the type of dispute. This is a national 
problem, not one of copyright law in general, much less fair use.  
Nor does the existence of a fair use defense lead to lots of litigation. The 
U.S. has a reputation of being a litigious society. Here are the facts. In 2002, 
in our trial courts, the number of all copyright cases filed was finally 
separately broken out. In that year, there were 274,842 civil cases filed. Of 
those, 2,084 were copyright cases, or 0.75%. How many of those 2,084 
resulted in fair use opinions in all of 2002? Only nine. As a percent of all 
civil cases filed, fair use rulings accounted for 0.004% of district courts' 
docket.  Any doctrine that results in a defense being decided in only 0.004% 
of all cases decided at the trial level is hardly a "flood of litigation."  
And what makes up the bulk of litigation in the United States? Far and 
away, most copyright litigation is brought by one company, Malibu Media 
LLC, a pornography company. Here is the most recent report, by 
Bloomberg Law, on litigation trends in the U.S. in 2016: 
 
Copyright complaints fell 25 percent to 3,811 in 2016 from the 
previous year. Volumes of copyright complaints continued to 
fluctuate, partly due to irregular activity from adult film maker 
Malibu Media LLC, which has filed more than 5,000 lawsuits since 
2012. Malibu still files more copyright infringement lawsuits than 
                                                 
29 See “Is There Such a Thing as an Affordable Lawyer? 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/ is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-
lawyer/371746/  
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any other company in the country.30 
 
Fair use is not an issue in Malibu’s cases. If we want to crack down on 
the amount of copyright litigation, we should crack down on pornographers, 
not parodists. 
 
A. Yes, fair use is fact-specific and that’s a good thing 
 
There is a big difference between an exemption and fair use. 
Exemptions are blanket passes on liability: if you are within the class of 
works or behavior covered by the exemption, you have no liability. There is 
no weighing of different factors, including importantly no concern with 
whether the exempt behavior harms the market for the original work. Not so 
with fair use. Fair use is focused on individual uses and the individual (or 
company) who asserts fair use as a defense. (And as an affirmative defense, 
much less, meaning the party who claims fair use has the evidentiary burden 
of proving it). The result in a fair use case is based only on the facts of that 
case, and in reaching the result, one must weigh various factors, including 
whether the defendant’s conduct harms the market for plaintiff’s work. 
That’s a good thing to examine. So yes, fair use is fact-specific and that’s a 
good thing: by being fact-specific courts are able to hear all relevant 
evidence and make a considered judgment, but are not “legislating” the 
outcome for future cases. 
 
B. No, fair use is not unpredictable  
 
The argument that fair use is so fact-specific that it is unpredictable 
singles out fair use for treatment we don’t apply to other fields of law: the 
argument is equally applicable to the “reasonable person” in tort and 
negligence law, and the “rule of reason” in antitrust law. These standards do 
not exist independently of the facts of the particular case.  Yet, we do not 
                                                 
30 See https://www.bna.com/patent-copyright-lawsuit-n73014449878/ 
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hear complaints that tort law or antitrust law are inherently unpredictable. 
Even within copyright law, all of the foundational issues in copyright are 
equally fact-specific:  did you contribute enough to be considered an author, 
did you imbue the work with enough originality for the work to be 
protected? 
Here is an illustrated example of the fact-specifc nature of the most 
foundational of all copyright questions, is a work protected? It is from a 
2008 opinion31 written by Judge Neil Gorsuch, who was nominated to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on January 31, 2017. The dispute concerned a digital 
wire-frame computer model of a Toyota car made by a contractor of an 
advertising agency. The contractor gave a license to use the model and 
claimed the scope of the license had been exceeded, which would have 
resulted in copyright infringement, if the model was a protected work. 
Toyota argued the computer model was not an original work of authorship 
because it faithfully reproduced the appearance of the actual car.  Here are 
pictures of the model:  
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In holding that Meshwerks’ efforts, while substantial, were not the type 
the copyright law protects, the court first turned to foundational legal 
elements that would guide its decision: 
 
What exactly does it mean for a work to qualify as “original”? In 
Feist, the Supreme Court clarified that the work must be 
“independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from 
other works. In addition, the work must “possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also 
William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:27 (“both independent 
creation and a minimal degree of creativity are required”), though 
this is not to say that to count as containing a minimal degree of 
creativity a work must have aesthetic merit in the minds of judges 
(arguably not always the most artistically discerning lot). 32 
 
In short, the Court did not look to the statute for guidance, because the 
statute doesn’t and can’t give guidance. Instead, the court cited judge-made 
foundational principles. Next, the court looked to the facts of how the 
model was created. Here is the court’s description of the process of 
creation: 
 
Meshwerks took copious measurements of Toyota’s vehicles by 
covering each car, truck, and van with a grid of tape and running an 
articulated arm tethered to a computer over the vehicle to measure 
all points of intersection in the grid. Based on these measurements, 
modeling software then generated a digital image resembling a wire-
frame model. In other words, the vehicles’ data points 
(measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the 
modeling software connected the dots to create a “wire frame” of 
each vehicle. 
                                                                                                                            
31 Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 




At this point, however, the on-screen image remained far from perfect 
and manual “modeling” was necessary. Meshwerks personnel fine-tuned or, 
as the company prefers it, “sculpted,” the lines on screen to resemble each 
vehicle as closely as possible. Approximately 90 percent of the data points 
contained in each final model, Meshwerks represents, were the result not of 
the first-step measurement process, but of the skill and effort its digital 
sculptors manually expended at the second step. For example, some areas of 
detail, such as wheels, headlights, door handles, and the Toyota emblem, 
could not be accurately measured using current technology; those features 
had to be added at the second “sculpting” stage, and Meshwerks had to 
recreate those features as realistically as possible by hand, based on 
photographs. Even for areas that were measured, Meshwerks faced the 
challenge of converting measurements taken of a three-dimensional car into 
a two-dimensional computer representation; to achieve this, its modelers 
had to sculpt, or move, data points to achieve a visually convincing result. 
The purpose and product of these processes, after nearly 80 to 100 hours of 
effort per vehicle, were two-dimensional wire-frame depictions of Toyota’s 
vehicles that appeared three-dimensional on screen, but were utterly 
unadorned-lacking color, shading, and other details.33 
Finally, in classic fashion, the court applied the guiding principles to the 
facts to reach its holding: 
 
[W]e hold that the unadorned images of Toyota's vehicles cannot be 
copyrighted by Meshwerks and likewise must be filtered out. To the 
extent that Meshwerks' digital wire-frame models depict only those 
unadorned vehicles, having stripped away all lighting, angle, 
perspective, and “other ingredients” associated with an original 
expression, we conclude that they have left no copyrightable matter. 
 
                                                                                                                            
32 528 F.3d at 1262-1263. 
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Confirming this conclusion as well is the peculiar place where 
Meshwerks stood in the model-creation pecking order. On the one 
hand, Meshwerks had nothing to do with designing the appearance 
of Toyota's vehicles, distinguishing them from any other cars, 
trucks, or vans in the world. That expressive creation took place 
before Meshwerks happened along, and was the result of work done 
by Toyota and its designers; indeed, at least six of the eight vehicles 
at issue are still covered by design patents belonging to Toyota and 
protecting the appearances of the objects for which they are issued. 
… On the other hand, how the models Meshwerks created were to 
be deployed in advertising-including the backgrounds, lighting, 
angles, and colors-were all matters left to those … who came after 
Meshwerks left the scene. Meshwerks thus played a narrow, if 
pivotal, role in the process by simply, if effectively, copying 
Toyota's vehicles into a digital medium so they could be 
expressively manipulated by others. 
… 
Were we to afford copyright protection in this case, we would run 
aground on one of the bedrock principles of copyright law-namely, 
that originality, “as the term is used in copyright, means only that 
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works ).” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. Because our 
copyright laws protect only “original” expression, the reason for 
refusing copyright protection to copies is clear, “since obviously a 
copier is not a creator, much less an ‘independent’ creator.” Patry on 
Copyright § 3:28; see also id. (“The key is whether original matter 
in which protection is claimed is the result of plaintiff's ingenuity 
rather than appropriation of another's material.”)34 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
33 528 F.3d at 1260-1261. 
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This is the way all courts throughout the world would decide similar 
cases, common law or civil law, and none of it is the result of applying a 
statute, rules, or a closed list of factors. Principles and facts alone are the 
courts’ tools in determining the most foundational element of copyright: is 
this a work protected by copyright? Nor is originality the only foundational 
element in which this occurs. The idea-expression dichotomy, in which 
“ideas” are not protected, but “expression” is, provides another example of 
the inherently fact-specific nature of a foundational element of copyright 
laws. One of the greatest U.S. judges ever, Learned Hand, made this point 
in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.: “Obviously, no principle 
can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ 
and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must therefore inevitably be 
ad hoc.”35 Yet, the idea-expression dichotomy is a bedrock of copyright 
laws around the world, and is not subject to criticism, even though like fair 
use, it is fact specific and therefore allegedly “unpredictable.”  
All of the other elements of copyright infringement litigation are 
similarly situated: Was the copying de minimis? If not, was the copying 
material enough for the two works to be substantially similar? As early as 
1836, English courts held these inquiries involve multiple factors that could 
not form the basis for precedent, seen in this opinion by Lord Chancellor 
Cottenham:  
 
When it comes to a question of quantity [of copying], it must be 
very vague. One writer might take all the vital part of another’s 
book, though it might be but a small proportion of the book in 
quantity. It is not only quantity but value that is always looked to. It 
is useless to refer to any particular cases as to quantity. 
 
This too is a bedrock of modern copyright law, never challenged or 
criticized as making copyright protection merely the right to hire a lawyer. 
                                                                                                                            
34 528 F.3d at 1265-1266. 
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The inquiry into whether one is a joint author is the same, as one court 
observed: 
 
[A] determination as to whether a work was created jointly 
involves an examination of both the quantity and quality of the 
parties’ contributions as factors bearing on the ultimate question, 
intent. While a co-author’s contribution need not equal the other 
author’s, at least when the authors are not immediately and 
obviously collaborating, the co-authors contribution must be 
“significant” both in quality and quantity in order to permit an 
inference that the parties intended a joint work. 36 
 
I have 22 years of practical experience in applying fair use, both as a 
private lawyer and as in-house counsel at Google. In those 22 years, I have 
not found applying fair use any more uncertain than any of the many other, 
foundational, common law principles in fair use discussed above. In the 
United States, every day corporate lawyers make fair use determinations 
with substantial consequences. Many companies are both copyright owners 
and users. Large U.S. media companies routinely rely on fair use, telling 
evidence that the doctrine is not uncertain to those that use it the most. 
Viacom’s Comedy Central channel could not exist without fair use. 
Hardware companies like Apple have benefitted tremendously from fair 
use. The iPod was built on fair use: the only way it could have -- and did 
work commercially – is by allowing people to copy their existing fair use 
personal copies onto the iPod. Had Apple built the iPod by only allowing 
people to use it with newly bought songs, it would have been dead on 
arrival. Fair use made it possible for the iPod and iTunes to exist. And who 
can forget this classic advertisement: 
 
                                                                                                                            
35 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).  
36 Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co ., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 





The certainty with which U.S. companies routinely release products that 
rely on fair use is borne out in how fair use is adjudicated. In the 19 years 
since the last significant amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act (the 1998 
DMCA), there were 64 court of appeals opinion on fair use (for a 
population of 320 million people). Of those 64 opinions, 50 affirmed the 
lower court, 13 reversed, and one was mixed (affirming some works, 
remanding on others). Leaving aside the mixed decision, there was a 
reversal rate of only 20%. This means 80% of the time fair use judgments 
are affirmed. If you give a client an 80% chance of prevailing on appeal in 
any case, copyright or not, that's pretty darn good. 
 
C. Closed fair-dealing lists are not inherently more certain than fair use 
 
If fair use is not unpredictable, at least aren’t closed-list fair dealing 
systems more certain? Certainty in law is generally a good thing. People 
should not be held to have violated a vague law. When we pay our taxes, we 
want to know exactly how much we pay. When we drive, we want to know 
the exact speed limit. There are areas of copyright law where we want, and 
should have precise provisions, as with compulsory licensing, which 
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involves payment of a government set fee as a way to avoid infringement.  
The foundational elements of copyright law have, however, never been 
written like tax laws, speed limits, or even compulsory license provisions: 
the foundational elements of copyright law have always been standards, not 
rules based, in common law and civil law countries alike. The analyses of 
these questions have always been judge-made and fact specific, for the 
simple reason that creativity and innovation are dynamic. For our copyright 
laws to be effective they too must be dynamic, a synonym of which is 
flexible.  
And they are: in the 1976 Act, the U.S. Congress deliberately created an 
open-ended definition of “copy,”37 and a list of exclusive rights that are 
flexible.38 Thus, when in the mid-1980s, digital music formats became 
popular, there was no need for Congress to amend the law to enable 
copyright owners to go after those who were reproducing their analog 
works without permission, because the law was drafted to be open-ended. 
That’s a good thing. Similarly, by not providing definitions of most forms 
of protected subject matter, Congress gave artists and authors the flexibility 
they need to develop new forms of expression without the need to go to 
Congress. As the legislative reports noted: “Authors are continually finding 
new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms 
that these new expressive methods will take.”39 To address this, Congress 
inserted into the statute two terms which are in turn defined as being 
illustrative and not limitative: “include” and “such as”: 
 
The second sentence of section 102 lists seven broad categories 
which the concept of ‘works‘ of authorship‘ is said to ‘include.‘ The 
use of the word ‘include,‘ as defined in section 101, makes clear that 
the listing is ‘illustrative and not limitative,‘ and that the seven 
categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of ‘original works of 
                                                 
37 See 17 USC section 101. 
38 See 17 USC section 106. 
39 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976). 
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authorship‘ that the bill is intended to protect. Rather, the list sets 
out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with 
sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded 
concepts of the scope of particular categories.40 
 
Fair use got the exact same treatment for the exact same reason, right 
down to the use of “include” and “such as” in Section 107, noted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Harper & Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
which, after citing the statutory list of possible fair use purposes, held: 
“This listing was not intended to be exhaustive; see section 101 (definition 
of ‘including’ and ‘such as.’”).41 As the legislative reports explain: 
 
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some 
guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine 
apply. However, the endless variety of situations and combinations 
of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the 
formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the 
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but 
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially 
during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad 
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria 
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended 
to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, 
narrow, or enlarge it in any way.42 
 
It is not coincidental that there is an exact parallel between how 
Congress treated copyrightability and how it treated fair use: both involve 
dynamic processes and thus require flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to 
                                                 
40 Id. at 53. 
41 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
42 Id. at 66. 
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give authors the freedom to find new ways to express themselves, and 
flexibility is necessary so that all authors can creatively build on the works 
of others.  
Closed lists cannot provide that flexibility: the very idea of top-down 
government approved lists of which creative or innovative activity should 
be permitted should be an anathema to authors, artists, and performers.  
Moreover, it is an illusion that a closed list is inherently precise: the mere 
fact that a provision is specific does not mean it is precise, nor that it can 
practically be implemented without reference to the principles that animate 
its underlying purpose. Language is inherently open textured and is not 
susceptible to the “originalist” prattle bandied about by some in the legal 
field.  The classic example, given by H.L.A. Hart in 1958 is this: 
 
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. 
Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, 
rollerskates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, 
as we say, to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or 
not?'43 
In a reply to Hart, Lon Fuller asked him about a World War II military 
truck set on a pedestal as a memorial. Is that a vehicle? What about an 
ambulance? A stroller? A wheel chair?44 The answers could not be found in 
the closed list label “vehicle,” but only in the purpose of the statute and the 
principles that animate that purpose. Fair dealing provisions that specify 
classes of uses unavoidably leave substantial discretion both as to the 
boundaries of those classes and as to what constitutes fair dealing within 
those classes.  
This is seen in the Canadian fair dealing provisions. The Canadian 
Supreme Court ruled in a case involving lawyers’ photocopying articles 
that: “The fair dealing exception … is a user's right” that “must not be 
                                                 
43 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harvard Law Review 
593, 607 (1958). 
44 Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law---A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harvard Law 
33 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2017-01 
 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
interpreted restrictively.” On that basis, the Canadian Supreme Court, in 
interpreting the closed list label of “research,” held that “Research must be 
given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights 
are not unduly constrained.”45 The word “research” was thus understood by 
reference to the underlying principles of users’ rights, and users’ rights 
being interpreted in a “large and liberal way.” 
The Court later expanded beyond lawyers doing research in that earlier 
case to include consumers listening to 30 second previews of music, since 
customers could be considered to be “researching” whether to purchase the 
album.46 As a result of these interpretations of the closed list purpose of 
“research,” Canadian fair dealing law is, in some respects, broader and more 
elastic than U.S. fair use law since a U.S. court had rejected such previews 
as fair use. 47  In the preview case, the Canadian Supreme Court wrote: 
 
[21] It is true that an important goal of fair dealing is to allow users 
to employ copyrighted works in a way that helps them engage in 
their own acts of authorship and creativity… But that does not argue 
for permitting only creative purposes to qualify as “research” 
under s. 29  of the Copyright Act .  To do so would ignore the fact 
that the dissemination of works is also one of the Act’s purposes, 
which means that dissemination too, with or without creativity, is in 
the public interest.  It would also ignore that “private study”, a 
concept that has no intrinsic relationship with creativity, was also 
expressly included as an allowable purpose in s. 29 .  Since 
“research” and “private study” both qualify as fair dealing purposes 
under s. 29 , we should not interpret the term “research” more 
restrictively than “private study”. 
                                                                                                                            
Review 630, 663 (1958). 
45 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 
at 50. 
46 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, [2012] 2 
SCR 326. 
47 See United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 599 
F.Supp.2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
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[22] Limiting research to creative purposes would also run counter 
to the ordinary meaning of “research”, which can include many 
activities that do not demand the establishment of new facts or 
conclusions.  It can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or 
confirmatory.  It can in fact be undertaken for no purpose except 
personal interest.  It is true that research can be for the purpose of 
reaching new conclusions, but this should be seen as only one, not 
the primary component of the definitional framework. 
 
Thus, not only is the term “research” in the Canadian closed list not any 
more certain than in the U.S. “open” system, fair dealing statutes may result 
in decisions more liberal than those in fair use regimes. What should matter 
is not the label, but the analysis: both systems involve a flexible application 
of law to the facts according to a legislative purpose. Fair use is neither 
more nor less uncertain, unpredictable, likely to lead to litigation, nor to 
diminish rights than any other inquiry. If we want to further creativity and 
innovation, our copyright laws must allow for such flexibility because that 
the very nature of creativity and innovation.  
It is, moreover, illogical and against the evidence that a closed list of 
permissible uses can simultaneously be precise yet broad enough to cover 
uses that the legislature didn’t think of at the time but would have permitted 
had it thought about it. No legislature, no matter how conscientious and 
careful can predict the future, and as a result cannot draft laws that will be 
effective for a future it cannot see. Here is an example. With the Internet 
widely available to school children of all ages, the opportunities for learning 
are fantastic. So too are the opportunities for cheating, given how easy it is 
to electronically cut and paste from an online source. Educators do not have 
the resources to manually check every student paper to look for evidence of 
plagiarism. A private company, Turnitin, came up with a solution: if 
educators gave them electronic versions of student papers, it could 
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automatically check the papers against a database of other papers and online 
sources. A school district in the state of Virginia signed up; a number of 
students sued for copyright infringement. The defendant asserted fair use. 
In affirming the trial court,48 the court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in 2009 agreed the use was fair. The appellate court noted that defendant 
was a for profit entity, that its copying of the students’ works was its 
business model, and that it copied the entirety of the works. In many fair 
use cases, these would be serious strikes against the defense. But what was 
the reality? The reality was that the company was acting on behalf of the 
school in order to address what had become a serious plagiarism problem. 
As the court wrote, “use of these works was completely unrelated to 
expressive content and was instead aimed at detecting and discouraging 
plagiarism.” The use in question did not fit within any of the enumerated 
fair use purposes in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and would not 
fit within any closed, fair dealing list either. But so what? The use was for a 
valuable social purpose, was not for appropriating the expressive content of 
the student papers, and did not harm their market should they ever sought to 
sell the papers. The advantage of fair use is that it flexible nature could and 
did come to the right result. The disadvantage of a closed list (and no list at 
all even more so) is that it can’t, unless a court, in a results-oriented 
approach, wildly stretches the meaning of a word to get to the result it 
wants. That is not an approach we should want, and such an approach 
would truly create uncertainty for future cases. 
The choices are not to legislate at all and have a legal Wild West; to 
legislate in a manner strictly applicable to the present thereby necessitating 
frequent revisions on the pain of laws becoming irrelevant or ignored; or to 
legislate in a manner that is applicable to the present but is flexible enough 
to be applied to the immediate future. Flexibility does not mean without 
guidance, and this is where principles come in. Principles can guide judges 
                                                 
48A.V. v. iParidigms,http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/081424.P.pdf. 
 
Again note how often this occurs, rendering the fair use is uncertain argument silly. 
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and juries about how to decide future cases. Without such guidance, judges 
and juries are placed in an untenable position: they have to decide a case 
without knowing how the legislature wished the case to be handled. Fair 
use, with its set of principles and almost 300 years of precedent, is ably 
situated to address such dilemmas. 
 
D. Fair use is not unique to the American legal system  
 
In our current era of alternative facts, it should not be surprising that fair 
use is described by some as inappropriate for any country other than the 
U.S. Fair use is not culturally-specific or rooted in the United States. It is 
not vegemite which Australians have a unique fondness for, Scottish haggis, 
Japanese wasp crackers, or Icelandic Kæstur hákarl (treated shark). It was, 
in fact, adopted from the UK along with marmite (a cousin of vegemite). 
The type of inquiry that one engages in with fair use, is as noted above, no 
different from the foundational copyright inquiries that all courts in all 
countries of the world engage in.  
What is peculiarly American about asking why someone copied? What 
is peculiarly American about inquiring whether the work copied is a highly 
original work of fiction or an intensely fact-laden work like a compilation 
of data? What is peculiarly American about inquiring into how much of the 
original was copied and whether the amount copied was necessary to the 
copier’s purpose? What is peculiarly American about caring whether the 
copying resulted in harm to the market for the original?  
Everything is right about these questions, and courts all over the world 
consider these factors regardless of the label given to the inquiry. They 
consider these factors because they should; the factors are important to 
fulfilling the purposes of copyright. Would one rather not know the answer 
to these questions? Of course not. 
 
 





Once understood, fair use should be seen as a constructive, necessary 
flexible tool to ensure that the purposes of copyright – encouraging 
creativity, innovation, and learning – are in fact achieved. One can have 
laws that suppress creativity and innovation, laws that support these 
activities, or laws that are ignored. My preference, and hopefully that of 
policymakers, is to have laws that work. Fair use works: 300 years of 
experience proves it. 
 
 
 
 
 
